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Abstract—Sensing devices acting as interconnected data
sources are becoming increasingly ubiquitous in concepts of IoT-
enabled smart cities, but they typically lack physical protection
and are susceptible to being compromised. To address this issue,
a great-alternative-region (GAR)-based approach for deploying
network monitors to locate compromised data sources is pro-
posed. The GAR concept is introduced according to the network
topology and connectivity characteristics, and the GARs with
the most complete connectivity are identified as the candidate
monitor locations, thereby transforming the problem of monitor
deployment into a traditional K-center problem. Based on the
demonstrated relationship between the monitor locations and the
locating accuracy, the optimization objective for reasonably de-
ploying monitors is designed to minimize the maximum number
of hops between the data sources and their nearest monitors, and
the optimal deployment pattern is achieved using an improved
genetic algorithm. Finally, simulation-based results are presented
to illustrate the performance of this approach.
Index Terms—Smart city, monitor deployment, compromised
data source, great alternative region, genetic algorithm.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart cities have become an important research field not
only because of their important and varied application sce-
narios but also because of their well-addressed fundamental
infrastructures [1]. Recently, Internet of Things (IoT), as a
supporting technology, has played an irreplaceable role in
smart city design. Typically, via efficient deployment, nu-
merous resource-constrained sensing devices, also called data
sources, can be deployed to construct an interconnected net-
work, therein promising drastically enhanced capabilities for
automatic data collection and exploring physical phenomena
from surrounding environments by dynamically interacting
with human activities and/or machine systems [2]. However,
such sensing devices are usually deployed in open areas, where
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these unattended data sources lack physical protection. The
open nature of deploying these data sources, with its thus-far-
unresolved security issues, provides adversaries or attackers
with opportunities to intrude upon such data sources and
perform a variety of malicious activities, such as tampering
with data and disseminating harmful information. Meanwhile,
the dissemination of much harmful information also results in
the problem of uneven energy consumption [3]–[6], especially,
for battery-powered sensing devices, which has cascading
effects with disastrous results. Botnets of Things, with it-
s foreseeable damage potential, has been investigated as a
challenging academic and industrial topic [7]. Therefore, the
ability to locate compromised data sources in a timely manner
is important in effectively ensuring the network performance
of an IoT-enabled smart city [8], [9].
Because of the unpredictability of attacks, a commonly
used method in related proposals is to deploy monitors in a
network formed by interconnected data sources to collect the
disseminated information and thus to determine the compro-
mised data sources based on the collected local information
and the network topology. The locating efficiency primarily
depends on the adopted monitor deployment strategy, i.e.,
random deployment [10], betweenness-centrality-based de-
ployment [11], degree-centrality-based deployment [10], [12]
and rumor-centrality-based deployment [12]. Although these
approaches have been found to be effective in some scenarios,
they require the complete subgraph of information dissem-
ination in the network of interest to be obtained, which is
difficult to achieve. Hence, the problem of how to deploy
network monitors such that compromised data sources can be
located in an optimal manner remains a challenging issue,
and to the best of our knowledge, this problem has been
investigated to a much lesser extent. However, deployment
problems have generally received considerable attention in
recent decades and are widely and well investigated in other
fields of research [13]–[17]. These proposals typically adopt
similar methodologies. The many constraints and objectives
involved are first systematically considered as a basis for
the formulation of single-objective or multi-objective models.
Then, these models are solved using intelligent algorithms to
achieve optimal deployment.
Motivated by these previous proposals in various research
fields, this paper proposes a heuristic monitor deployment
scheme for locating compromised data sources to address the
realistic security challenge facing IoT-enabled smart cities via
the following main contributions.
21. Based on an analysis of the network topology and
connectivity, the network area formed by interconnected data
sources is divided into different alternative regions (ARs),
and the new concept of great alternative regions (GARs) is
introduced to investigate the problem of monitor deployment.
In this context, the GARs are treated as the candidate monitor
locations, thereby transforming the addressed problem into a
traditional K-center problem.
2. The relationship between the monitor deployment loca-
tions and the accuracy of locating compromised data sources is
first investigated. Then, an optimization objective is formulated
to minimize the maximum number of hops between the data
sources and their nearest monitors for reasonably deploying a
set of monitors in the GARs.
3. An improved genetic algorithm is proposed to solve
the problem to achieve optimal deployment. Analytical and
simulation-based results for four different representative syn-
thetic networks with different connectivity characteristics are
presented to demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of
the proposed approach.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II introduces the AR generation principle and the GAR
concept. Section III presents the design of the optimization
objective ensuring the reasonable deployment. In Section IV,
an improved genetic algorithm is proposed to achieve optimal
deployment. In Section V, the experimental setup and analysis
results are addressed. Finally, we summarize and conclude the
paper in Section VI.
II. DETERMINING CANDIDATE LOCATIONS FOR MONITOR
DEPLOYMENT
A. Definitions
Without loss of generality, in a given network area of R2,
assuming that V = {v1, v2, ..., vn} is the set of deployed data
sources, (xi, yi) represents the plane coordinates of node vi,
and r is the valid node signal coverage radius. If the Euclidean
distance lij =
√
(xi − xj)2 + (yi − yj)2) between any two
nodes vi and vj satisfies lij ≤ r, then the two nodes act as
neighbors and can communicate directly, and the line linking
these two adjacent nodes is treated as an edge ei. In accordance
with these adjacency relations, the deployed nodes constitute
a limited undirected communication network, represented by
G(V,E), where V is the set of nodes and E is the set of
generated edges.
Based on the above definitions, Fig. 1(d) presents an illus-
tration introducing the AR concept, where vi and vj cannot
engage in direct communication. To connect them, a node
acting as a relay must be deployed in the overlapping region
of signal convergence, i.e., the shaded area in Fig. 1(d). This
overlapping area can be treated as an AR, where vi and vj
are the generating nodes and AR = 〈vi, vj〉. Accordingly, an
AR is a convergence region in which a deployed monitor can
directly communicate with all the generating nodes. Note that
the monitor can be deployed in any location in the AR with
the same connectivity and that the valid signal coverage area
of the deployed monitor is a coverage circle of r, which can
cover all nodes generating the AR.
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Fig. 1. Illustrations of the generation principle of ARs.
Based on the definition of an AR, we can formulate a
general conclusion for the generation principle of the ARs in
a scenario with m nodes. For a set of nodes {v1, v2, ..., vm},
if all Euclidean distances between pairs of nodes satisfy l ≤ r,
then the generated AR is the overlapping area of signal
coverage, as shown in Fig. 1(a). If at least one Euclidean
distance between a pair of nodes satisfies r < l ≤ 2r and no
Euclidean distance between any two nodes satisfies l > 2r,
then although the nodes in {v1, v2, ..., vm} generate several
ARs, only a monitor deployed in AR = 〈v1, v2, ..., vm〉 can
simultaneously communicate with all nodes in the set, as
shown in Fig. 1(b) and (c). If any Euclidean distance between
a pair of nodes satisfies l > 2r, then there is no AR in which
a deployed monitor could connect to all nodes simultaneously,
as shown in Fig. 1(d) and (e).
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Fig. 2. Illustrations of coverage circles and the process for determining a
coverage circle.
Because the valid signal coverage area of a monitor de-
ployed at any location in an AR is a coverage circle of r,
multiple coverage circles of this type are possible. As shown in
Fig. 2, the shaded area corresponding to AR = 〈v1, v2, v3, v4〉
is generated by the set of nodes {v1, v2, v3, v4}. Regardless of
where the monitor is deployed in the AR, e.g., at o1, o2 or o3,
the generated coverage circle covers all four generating nodes.
Interestingly, as shown in Fig. 2(b), for the generated coverage
circles, we find that there is at least one coverage circle whose
boundary will cross two of the generating nodes. In other
words, two generating nodes may define a coverage circle
covering all generating nodes. Although the circle defined by
any two generating nodes might not necessarily be a coverage
circle, there will always be a pair of generating nodes that
can define a coverage circle to determine an AR. As shown
in Fig. 2(c), for the AR = 〈v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6〉, because the
circle O2 determined by the two generating nodes v3 and v4
3does not cover v1, v2 and v5, it is not a coverage circle.
However, the circle O1 determined by the two generating
nodes v1 and v2 can be regarded as a coverage circle because
the circle covers all generating nodes.
Based on the above analysis, the concepts of boundary
points and boundary chords are introduced to more explicitly
describe the generating principles for ARs. Specifically, any
two nodes separated by a Euclidean distance that satisfies
l ≤ 2r are boundary points, and the line linking these two
nodes is a boundary chord. Two boundary points can generate
two symmetrical coverage circles with respect to the boundary
chord, which can be regarded as potential ARs. However,
because the number of boundary chords is large in complex
communication networks, a huge number of potential ARs can
exist. If we directly use the AR-based approach to solve the
addressed problem, it will undoubtedly increase the solving
complexity. Considering some of the generated potential ARs
have the same connectivity, we introduce the following two
rules to eliminate unnecessary ARs.
Rule 1. For the two potential ARs generated by any two
boundary points, if the set of nodes covered by one AR is a
subset of that covered by another AR, then the AR with the
larger coverage area is retained.
v1v2
v4 v3
v5
o1
o2
o1
o2
v5
v1 v2 v3
v4
v6
lv1,v2 < r
(a) (b)
vj
vz
AR2 AR3
AR1
AR4
vi
(c)
Fig. 3. Illustrations describing the elimination of unnecessary ARs.
As shown in Fig. 3(a), two symmetrical coverage circles, O1
and O2, are generated by the two boundary points v1 and v2;
in turn, these coverage circles determine two potential ARs:
ARO1 = 〈v1, v2, v3, v4〉 and ARO2 = 〈v1, v2, v5〉. Because
the set of nodes covered by one AR is not a subset of that
covered by another AR, both ARO1 and ARO2 are retained. If
there is no v5, then the set of nodes covered by ARO2 will be
a subset of that covered by ARO1 ; thus, only O1 is a coverage
circle, and ARO1 is retained.
Rule 2. If a boundary chord conforms to l ≤ r and neither
of the two generated symmetrical coverage circles covers any
nodes other than these two boundary points, then both potential
ARs are unnecessary and can be eliminated.
As shown in Fig. 3(b), the two symmetrical coverage circles
O1 and O2 generated by v1 and v2 do not cover any nodes
other than the two boundary points. Because a monitor can
be deployed at either node while maintaining connectivity, the
two determined potential ARs are unnecessary.
Using these two rules, unnecessary ARs are eliminated.
However, the retained ARs may still have some overlapping
connectivity. It is therefore necessary to introduce the GAR
concept to identify the ARs with the most complete connectiv-
ity, thereby reducing the complexity of solving the addressed
problem. In Fig. 3(c), several ARs exist: AR1 = 〈vi, vj〉,
AR2 = 〈vi, vz〉, AR3 = 〈vj , vz〉 and AR4 = 〈vi, vj , vz〉.
Clearly, a monitor deployed in AR4 will provide all the
connection functionality of the monitors deployed in AR1,
AR2 and AR3, that is, AR4 has the most complete connec-
tivity. Thus, AR4 can be regarded as a GAR. Accordingly,
the concept of a GAR is derived as follows. Let AR =
{AR1, AR2, ..., ARm} be the set of ARs in a given plane
area. If ARi satisfies (1), that is, if the set of the generating
nodes of ARi is not a proper subset of that of any other ARs
in the set, then ARi can be regarded as a GAR.
∃ARi ⊆ AR,∀ARj ⊆ AR(j 6= i), ARi 6⊂ ARj (1)
B. Identifying Great Alternative Regions (GARs)
Based on the above definitions and analyses, the procedure
for identifying GARs is summarized as follows.
1. After traversing the plane network area of interest, if
there is a pair of nodes separated by a Euclidean distance
that satisfies l ≤ 2r, then these two nodes are regarded as
boundary points, and the line linking them is regarded as a
boundary chord.
2. The determined boundary points and boundary chord
generate two symmetrical coverage circles, which are regarded
as potential ARs. Then, a binary matrix AR = {aij}m×n
is created to record the ultimately retained ARs by applying
Rule 1 and Rule 2, where m is the number of generated ARs
and n is the number of nodes. If ARi covers the j-th node,
then aij=1; otherwise, aij=0, that is, for the i-th row in the
matrix, the node with aij=1 is the generating node for ARi.
3. In accordance with the definition of a GAR, if ARi
satisfies (1), then ARi is regarded as a GAR.
C. Generating the New Complete Network
After identifying the GARs, because a monitor deployed at
any location in a GAR will have the same connectivity, each
GAR can be abstracted as a virtual node and inserted into the
original network alongside the existing nodes to generate a
new complete network. To effectively express the topological
relations between the existing nodes and these virtual nodes
and to maintain the structural integrity of the newly generated
network, the node connectivity must be revised as follows.
The connections between existing nodes are two-way con-
nections, whereas the connection directed from an existing
node to a virtual node is one-way connection. Moreover,
because any given virtual node might not be ultimately chosen
as a monitor location, to avoid the routing of data through such
virtual nodes, no connections are established between virtual
nodes. After these revisions, a new complete network with
the set of nodes V ′ = {v1, v2, ...vn, vGAR1, ...}, in which the
GARs are treated as the candidate monitor locations, is gen-
erated. Thus, the addressed problem of monitor deployment is
transformed into a traditional K-center problem.
Note that a monitor deployed in a GAR will manage
all the generating nodes of that GAR. In a given network,
regardless of the locations of compromised data sources, if
4the optimal monitor deployment is achieved using the GAR-
based approach, it will facilitate the identification of any
compromised data sources.
III. OPTIMIZATION OBJECTIVE AND PROBLEM
FORMULATION
In the classical data propagation model, the data propagation
delay is directly determined by the propagation distance. Based
on the assumption that each data source will diffuse data along
the shortest path to the destination, Pinto et al. [10] proposed
a method for estimating the locations of data sources. In this
method, for any candidate data source, if the actual delay in
receiving the diffused data at each monitor is very close to the
theoretical delay calculated from the data propagation model,
then this candidate data source is identified as the true source
with a high probability. However, because of the difficulty
in acquiring the initial data diffusion moment, the theoretical
delay in receiving the diffused data at each monitor cannot
be directly obtained. Motivated by this difficulty, Pinto et al.
attempted to determine the true data source by comparing
the vectors of the actual delay and the theoretical delay of
receiving the diffused data at each monitor. In this paper,
to reasonably deploy a set of monitors in the GARs to
enhance the locating accuracy of compromised data sources,
we draw on the method proposed by Pinto et al. to deduce the
optimization objective.
Given a network G(V,E), the nodes in V are all likely to be
true data sources. At some point in time, if a set of monitors
denoted by {m1,m2, ...,mk} has received data diffused by
any candidate data source and the set of actual delays of
first receiving these data at the k monitors is represented
by {t1, t2, ..., tk}, then the vector of the actual delays of
the data reception at the k monitors can be written as ~v =
{v1, v2, ..., vk−1}T , where vi = ti+1 − t1 is the delay differ-
ence between monitor mi+1 and monitor m1. In the classical
data propagation model, according to the central limit theorem,
it is generally assumed that the propagation delay on each
network edge can be approximated as a normal distribution
represented by d ∼ N(µ, σ2). Therefore, for any candidate
data source, the set of theoretical delays in data reception
at the k monitors is represented by {t′1, t′2, ..., t′k}, where
t′i = µ · |h(s,mi)|, with |h(s,mi)| being the hop count along
the shortest path from the candidate data source s to mi. Ac-
cordingly, the vector of the theoretical delays in data reception
at the k monitors can be written as ~v′ = {v′1, v′2, ...v′k−1}T ,
where v′i = t
′
i+1 − t′1 = µ · (|h(s,mi+1)| − |h(s,m1)|).
Then, as shown in (2), a multivariate normally distributed
probability density, represented by sˆ, is employed to calculate
the similarity between ~v and ~v′. In this equation, for the
deployed monitors, if i = j, then [Λs]i,j = σ2 · |h(m1,mi)|;
otherwise, [Λs]i,j = σ2 · |h(m1,mi) ∩ h(m1,mj)|. Among
all candidate data sources, the source with the maximum sˆ is
identified as the true data source.
sˆ = exp[−1
2
(~v − ~v′)TΛ−1s (~v − ~v′)]/
√
|Λs| (2)
From the representation of ~v′, we can clearly see that the
differences in the hop counts along the shortest paths between
the candidate data source and the monitors serve as the basis
for calculating ~v′. For any candidate data source, when these
differences are increased, the similarity between ~v and ~v′
is higher. Thus, the probability of correctly determining the
true data source is increased, resulting in a higher locating
accuracy. The relationship between the hop-count difference
and the delay-vector similarity is analyzed in the following.
Assuming that M = {m|m ∈ M} is the set of deployed
monitors and S = {s|s ∈ V } is the set of candidate data
sources. h(si,m) is a path from a candidate data source si to
a monitor m, and |h(si,m)| is the hop count. Based on the
assumption that the propagation delay on a network edge ei is
independent identically distributed and can be approximated
as a normal distribution d(ei) ∼ N(µ, σ2) [10], for any two
monitors mi and mj , the value of d is defined in (3) as the
arithmetic mean of d(ei), ei ∈ (h(si,mi)∪ h(si,mj)). Then,
the expectation E(d) and the variance D(d) can be deduced
as shown in (4) and (5), respectively.
d =
| ∑
ei∈h(si,mj)
d(ei)−
∑
ei∈h(si,mi)
d(ei)|
|h(si,mj)| − |h(si,mi)| (3)
E(d) =
∑
ei∈h(si,mj)
d(ei)−
∑
ei∈h(si,mi)
d(ei)
|h(si,mj)| − |h(si,mi)|
=
|h(si,mj)| · µ− |h(si,mi)| · µ
|h(si,mj)| − |h(si,mi)| = µ
(4)
D(d) =
∑
ei∈h(si,mj)
D(d(ei)) +
∑
ei∈h(si,mi)
D(d(ei))
(|h(si,mj)| − |h(si,mi)|)2
=
|h(si,mj)| · σ2 + |h(si,mi)| · σ2
(|h(si,mj)| − |h(si,mi)|)2
=
|h(si,mj)|+ |h(si,mi)|
(|h(si,mj)| − |h(si,mi)|)2
· σ2
(5)
Based on the principle of Chebyshev’s inequality, the for-
mula (6) is deduced, where ε is an arbitrary positive integer.
p(|d− µ| < ε) ≥ 1− D(d)
ε2
= 1− |h(si,mj)|+ |h(si,mi)| · σ
2
(|h(si,mj)| − |h(si,mi)|)2 · ε2
(6)
If |h(si,mj)|− |h(si,mi)| → ∞, then p(|d−µ| < ε)→ 1,
that is, as the hop-count difference between the paths to the
two monitors approaches infinity, d approaches µ, and for si,
v ≈ v′ such that si would be a true data source. Based on the
above analysis, we conclude that the locations of the deployed
monitors affect the locating accuracy for the data sources.
Accordingly, we now deduce the optimization objective for the
problem of deploying a set of monitors in GARs to achieve
enhanced accuracy in locating compromised data sources.
Given a monitor deployment strategy for the prob-
lem discussed in this paper, following the above assump-
tions, min
m∈M
(|h(si,m)|) is the minimum hop count along
the paths from si to any monitor in M , and HM =
5max
s∈S
{min
m∈M
(|h(s,m)|)} is the maximum of these minimum
hop counts for all candidate data sources. Suppose that mi and
mj are the nearest monitors to any two candidate compromised
data sources si and sj , respectively. The hop counts between
the candidate compromised data sources and their respective
nearest monitors satisfy the following: |h(si,mi)| ≤ HM
and |h(sj ,mj)| ≤ HM . A triangle can be constructed using
si, sj and mj , where |h(si,mj)| ≥ |h(si, sj)| − |h(sj ,mj)|
according to the geometrical relationship among the edges of
a triangle. Accordingly, the sum of the differences between the
hop counts from si to each other monitor (except the nearest
monitor mi) and the hop count from si to mi, represented by
SUM(|h(si,M)|), is calculated as shown in (7), where |M |
is the number of deployed monitors.
SUM(|h(si,M)|) =
|M |∑
j=1,j 6=i
(|h(si,mj)| − |h(si,mi)|)
≥
|M |∑
j=1,j 6=i
(|h(si, sj)| − |h(sj ,mj)| − |h(si,mi)|)
=
|M |∑
j=1,j 6=i
|h(si, sj)| −
|M |∑
j=1,j 6=i
|h(sj ,mj)|
− (|M | − 1) · |h(si,mi)|
(7)
If AH is the average hop count between nodes, then because
|h(si,mi)| ≤ HM and |h(sj ,mj)| ≤ HM , we can write
SUM(|h(si,M)|) ≥ (|M | − 1)(AH − 2HM ). Accordingly,
given two different monitor deployment strategies with dif-
ferent sets of monitors M1 and M2, if HM1 < HM2 , then
SUM(|h(si,M1)|) > SUM(|h(si,M2)|). We now investigate
the relationship between SUM(|h(si,M)|) and the locating
accuracy, and then we deduce the optimization objective for
monitor deployment.
If SUM(h(si,M1)) > SUM(h(si,M2)), then according to
the above discussion on the relationship between the hop-
count difference and the delay-vector similarity, we can write
p(|dM1 − µ| < ε) > p(|dM2 − µ| < ε), that is, the arithmetic
mean value of the propagation delay in M1 (denoted by dM1 )
is much closer to µ than that in M2. We can thus conclude
that for any candidate compromised data source si, the actual
delay in the reception of data diffused from si is closer to the
theoretical delay for M1. Thus, the locating accuracy of M1
(denoted by PM1 ) is higher than that of M2 for the location
estimation method proposed by Pinto et al. [10].
min HM = max
s∈S
{min
m∈M
(|h(s,m)|)}
s.t.
N∑
i=1
xij = 1
max
N∑
i=1
( max
j=1,...,|V |
{xij})=N
(8)
According to the above discussion, if HM1 < HM2 ,
then SUM(|h(si,M1)|) > SUM(|h(si,M2)|); consequently,
PM1 > PM2 . Hence, as shown in (8), to achieve a higher
locating accuracy for any compromised data sources, the opti-
mization objective for monitor deployment should be designed
to minimize the maximum of the minimum hop counts for all
candidate data sources (HM ). |V | is the number of deployed
data sources, and N is the number of GARs (candidate mon-
itor locations) in the newly generated complete network. Let
xij and max
j=1,...,|V |
{xij} be the decision variables. If vj is served
by monitor mi, then xij=1; otherwise, xij=0. If GARi is
actually set as a monitor, then max
j=1,...,|V |
{xij} = 1; otherwise,
max
j=1,...,|V |
{xij} = 0. Accordingly, the first constraint on the
optimization objective function ensures that each data source is
served by only one monitor, and the second constraint ensures
that the monitors are deployed in GARs and that the total
number of deployed monitors is not greater than the number
of generated GARs.
IV. DESIGN OF THE SOLUTION ALGORITHM
In terms of the introduced formulation, the problem of
optimizing monitor deployment for locating compromised data
sources using the proposed optimization objective has been
proven to be NP-hard [18]. Here, an improved genetic algorith-
m (GA), the pseudo-code of which is shown in Algorithm 1,
is proposed to solve this problem. The specific improvements
are described below.
Algorithm 1 Improved GA for deployment optimization
Input: the newly generated complete network with GARs; the maximum
number of monitors, N ; the maximum number of iterations, max g; the
population size, N ′; the crossover probability, pcrossover ; the mutation
probability, pmutation; and the generation gap, GAP .
Output: the locations of the deployed monitors
1: Use the binary coding method to generate the initial population X(0) for
the first generation g = 0; /* Initiation */
2: while (g ≤ max g) do
3: Use dynamic calibration to map the optimization objective to a fitness
function, F (X) = G(X)max −G(X) +$g ;
4: Perform crossover and mutation operations unconstrained by the two
constraints on the optimization objective function;
/* Crossover: with the crossover probability pcrossover .
5: Execute the crossover operation for each selected parent pair (Xi, Xj)
from X(g) using the double tangent point crossover operator;
6: Generate a population of hybrid offspring, Xcrossover ;
/* Mutation: with the mutation probability pmutation.
7: if (pi > pmutation)
/* pi is a randomly generated probability for the i-th individual in
Xcrossover */
Execute the mutation operation for the i-th individual in Xcrossover ;
Generate a population of mutated offspring, Xmutation;
8: endif
/* Selection: random-traversal-sampling-based selection.
9: Calculate the fitness value for each individual in Xmutation;
10: Select individuals with a selection probability of p(Xi) =
F (Xi)/
n∑
i=1
F (Xi);
/* reinsertion strategy.
11: In accordance with the GAP , select individuals from
Xmutation
⋃
X(g);
/* Generate the next generation of the population.
12: g = g + 1;
13: end while
(1) Using dynamic calibration, the optimization objective
function is first mapped to a fitness function, F (X) =
G(X)max−G(X)+$g , where G(X) is the objective function,
g is the number of iterations, G(X)max is the maximum value
of the objective function in each iteration, and $ ($ < 1) is a
6positive number. Subsequently, during the process of solving
the optimization objective, operations are performed without
explicit concern for whether the two specified constraints on
the objective are satisfied. Specifically, the first constraint is
naturally satisfied in all operations on the fitness function. To
ensure the satisfaction of the second constraint, a chromosome
repair strategy is applied to ensure that the maximum number
of monitors to be deployed is N and that the chromosomes
generated in each generation of the population are optimal,
thereby positively influencing the convergence.
(2) For the chromosome selection operation for each gen-
eration of the population, a strategy of random traversal
sampling is employed. Specifically, based on the cumulative
sum of the fitness vector, a random traversal sampling table
is created, and the corresponding fitness value is selected
according to a generated index. The index of the selected
individual is determined by comparing the generated random
value with the cumulative sum of the fitness vector. The
selection probability of an individual Xi is represented by
p(Xi) = F (Xi)/
n∑
i=1
F (Xi), where F (Xi) is the fitness value
of individual Xi. Additionally, to avoid eliminating excellent
individuals in each generation, a generation gap between each
pair of adjacent generations is set as a fixed ratio, and a rein-
sertion strategy is employed to retain the best individuals of
the parent generation in the offspring generation. Accordingly,
via this combination of a random traversal sampling strategy
and a reinsertion strategy, the inherent problems of premature
convergence and low search efficiency in genetic algorithms
are effectively eliminated.
V. SIMULATIONS AND ANALYSIS
A. Simulation Setup
The simulations were conducted on the MATLAB 2012a
platform running on the executing host: 64-bit Windows 7
operating system, Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3450 CPU @ 3.10
GHz, and 4 GB of RAM. Although the proposed GAR-based
approach would have better performance in a network with
a concentrated node distribution, not all real-world networks
have such feature. To better verify the efficiency of the pro-
posed approach for various applications, the nodes deployed
in the test networks should be distributed in a fragmented but
uniform manner, therein eliminating areas of both isolated and
concentrated nodes. Following these guidelines, four different
typical synthetic networks formed by interconnected data
sources were generated using NetworkX: a random regular
network, an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) network, a WS network and
a BA (scale-free) network. To reflect the large-scale node
features in the discussed practical background of a smart city,
1× 104 nodes were deployed in each test network.
The detailed characteristics of the four generated test net-
works are presented in Table I. average degree is the average
degree of the nodes; max degree is the maximum degree,
which reflects the edge density in the network; and diameter
is the network diameter, which is the maximum path length
among all pairs of accessible nodes.
The simulation-based analyses presented below were con-
ducted to illustrate the performance of the improved GA in
TABLE I
CONNECTIVITY CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FOUR TEST NETWORKS.
Network type average degree max degree diameter
random regular network 4 6 16
ER network 5 8 13
WS network 5 7 9
BA network 6 9 11
solving the addressed problem and to demonstrate the locating
accuracy of the proposed GAR-based approach.
B. Algorithm Evaluation
To clearly observe the results of monitor deployment, as
shown in Fig. 4(a), a 5×5 random regular network consisting
of 100 randomly distributed nodes is discussed here as an
illustration. With the stated guidelines for node distribution
and connectivity, the radius of the valid signal coverage
area for each node is 0.6. The parameters for the improved
GA were set as follows: N ′=500 (initial population size);
max g=300 (maximum number of iterations); pcrossover=0.9
and pmutation=0.05 (crossover and mutation probabilities);
and GAP=0.8 (generation gap). To clearly illustrate the effect
of monitor deployment after one run of the algorithm, the
result obtained when the number of deployed monitors was
|M | = 8 is shown in Fig. 4(b), where the deployed monitors,
indicated by solid dots, are existing nodes in the original
network, whereas the monitors indicated by open circles are
virtual nodes in the newly generated network with GARs.
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Fig. 4. Illustration of the application of the GAR-based approach.
The sets of generating nodes for the GARs corresponding
to each deployed monitor are shown in Table II. Although an
existing node might appear in the sets of generating nodes of
several GARs, it is covered by only a single monitor according
to the corresponding constraint on the optimization objective.
Additionally, the distribution of the nodes covered by the
deployed monitors yield an acceptable performance in terms
of load balancing. Fig. 5 is an illustration of the performance
of load balance among the deployed monitors, which could
be indicated by the distributions of the nodes covered by
the deployed monitors. Here, the absolute value of deviation
of the number of nodes covered by each monitor calculated
by |ni − n|/n is adopted to represent the distributions of the
covered nodes, where, ni is the number of nodes covered by
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Fig. 5. The performance of load balance among the deployed monitors.
i-th monitor and n is the arithmetic mean value of ni. From
Fig. 5, we can clearly see that the initial nodes are relatively
balanced covered.
TABLE II
SETS OF GENERATING NODES FOR THE GARS CORRESPONDING TO THE
DEPLOYED MONITORS.
Location Set of generating nodes for each GAR
8 4,5,7,8,9,10,14,15,16,17,18,19,34,39,51,52
83 12,13,42,43,44,67,68,71,78,80,81,82,83,84,86,88,90
102 1,2,3,6,11,12,13,22,24,30,31
109 42,43,60,62,63,64,65,71,78,81,82,83,91,93,94,95,96,97,98,99,100
121 16,52,64,68,70,73,75,76,77,81,85,87,89,90,92
136 17,18,19,40,41,45,49,51,54,56,61,66,69,72,74,79
165 21,23,25,27,28,34,37,38,44,45,48,50,52,53,57,58,59,60,62,63
203 20,23,26,28,29,33,35,36,41,45,46,47,55,56
To further convincingly demonstrate the efficiency of the
improved GA, as shown in Fig. 6, a K-means clustering
algorithm was also used to solve the problem of interest for
comparison, with all reported results for the two algorithms
averaged over 100 independent runs. Because the deployed
nodes were all likely candidates for attack, 10 nodes were
randomly selected in each run as the true compromised nodes
diffusing malicious data.
For both compared algorithms, as the number of deployed
monitors increases, the nodes can all be served by a monitor
within an increasingly small range, leading to a gradual
reduction in average of maximum hops and average hops;
however, these downward trends flatten out once a certain
number of deployed monitors is reached. The improved GA
solves the problem of interest based on the proposed GAR-
based approach, and the set of monitors finally deployed in
the GARs is determined by solving the proposed optimization
objective. Therefore, the improved GA clearly outperforms the
K-means algorithm in terms of average of maximum hops,
and it is also superior in terms of average hops for an
increasing number of deployed monitors. According to the
previously discussed relationship between the accuracy with
which compromised data sources can be located and the
monitor deployment locations, a reduction in average hops
corresponds to an increase in the average locating accuracy for
both algorithms. However, because of its evident superiority
in terms of average hops, the improved GA is also superior
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Fig. 6. Efficiency comparisons of the two tested algorithms.
to the K-means algorithm in terms of locating accuracy.
From Fig. 6(d), the convergence time of the improved GA
is longer than that of the K-means algorithm. Theoretical
analysis revealed that the time complexity of the K-means
algorithm is O(|V | · |M | ·max g), whereas the upper bound
on the time complexity of the improved GA is O((|V |−|M |)2·
|M | ·max g ·N ′). Therefore, the computational efficiency of
the K-means algorithm is undoubtedly higher than that of the
improved GA. However, from the presented comparison in
terms of average of maximum hops and average hops,
it is clear that the K-means algorithm is prone to premature
convergence when solving the addressed problem, whereas the
improved GA effectively eliminates the inherent problems of
premature convergence and low search efficiency, allowing the
improved GA to more reliably converge to a global optimal
solution. In short, although the improved GA has a longer
convergence time, it produces superior results when solving
the monitor deployment problem.
C. Comparison and Analysis of Locating Accuracy
To comprehensively demonstrate the locating accuracy
of the proposed GAR-based approach, four different typi-
cal monitor deployment schemes, i.e., random deploymen-
t [10], betweenness-centrality-based deployment [11], degree-
centrality-based deployment [10], [12] and rumor-centrality-
based deployment [12], were selected for comparative studies.
Note that the former three schemes and the GAR-based ap-
proach are all based on the method of estimating the locations
of data sources proposed by Pinto et al. [10]. By contrast, as a
baseline for comparison, the rumor-centrality-based scheme is
based on the direct estimation of the locations of data sources,
also known as rumor centers. Specifically, the rumor centrality
is a ‘graph score’ function, as defined in [12]; in this approach,
a positive number or score is assigned to each vertex, and the
estimated rumor center is the vertex with the maximal score.
For a fair comparison, regardless of the deployment scheme
used, the maximum number of deployed monitors must be less
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Fig. 7. Comparison of the locating accuracies in the random regular network.
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 1.1
 0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1
Lo
ca
tin
g 
ac
cu
ra
cy
The percentage of deployed monitors
GAR-based
Random
Betweenness Centrality
Degree Centrality
Rumor Centrality
(a) γ = 0.05
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 1.1
 0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1
Lo
ca
tin
g 
ac
cu
ra
cy
The percentage of deployed monitors
GAR-based
Random
Betweenness Centrality
Degree Centrality
Rumor Centrality
(b) γ = 0.1
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 1.1
 0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1
Lo
ca
tin
g 
ac
cu
ra
cy
The percentage of deployed monitors
GAR-based
Random
Betweenness Centrality
Degree Centrality
Rumor Centrality
(c) γ = 0.15
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 1.1
 0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1
Lo
ca
tin
g 
ac
cu
ra
cy
The percentage of deployed monitors
GAR-based
Random
Betweenness Centrality
Degree Centrality
Rumor Centrality
(d) γ = 0.2
Fig. 8. Comparison of the locating accuracies in the ER network.
than or equal to the number of generated GARs. Therefore,
in the simulations of the four test networks, we first deployed
a group of monitors corresponding to a certain percentage
of the number of generated GARs following each monitor
deployment scheme. Because all nodes except those acting as
monitors are likely candidates for attack, a percentage γ of
these nodes were randomly selected as the compromised data
sources, and analysis was performed to locate them and thus to
determine the locating accuracy. The locating accuracy results
for several values of γ on each test network are shown in
Fig. 7-Fig. 10; all reported results for the five schemes were
averaged over 100 independent runs.
In each test network with different percentages of compro-
mised data sources, the coverage of the monitors becomes finer
as the number of deployed monitors increases. The locating
accuracies achieved by the four schemes using the method pro-
posed by Pinto et al. [10] all increase with enhanced coverage.
Simultaneously, because of the differences in network connec-
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Fig. 9. Comparison of the locating accuracies in the WS network.
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Fig. 10. Comparison of the locating accuracies in the BA network.
tivity, the differences in locating accuracy are evident among
the four test networks. From the comparisons, regardless of
the deployment scheme used, the locating accuracy is much
higher for the BA network, whose connectivity is superior,
compared with the other three test networks.
Additionally, in each test network, if the percentage of
deployed monitors is sufficient, all nodes will be covered in
the GAR-based approach because of the manner in which the
GARs are defined, i.e., based on the network topology and
connectivity. By contrast, because of specific characteristics
of the network connectivity, some nodes may remain uncov-
ered by the deployed monitors in the random, betweenness-
centrality-based and degree-centrality-based schemes. It is
therefore possible for uncovered nodes to be chosen as attack
targets, which would then be impossible to identify. Therefore,
from the comparison of the results, the locating accuracy
achieved by the GAR-based approach totally outperforms that
achieved by the three other schemes.
9VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, the problem of locating compromised data
sources in the sensing network of an IoT-enabled smart city
was studied, and a GAR-based heuristic monitor deploymen-
t scheme was proposed to achieve effective identification.
Simulation results for four typical synthetic networks with
different connectivity characteristics show that the GAR-
based approach is more effective and efficient than other
representative schemes. In our future work, we would like to
generalize the GAR-based approach to a richer variety of real
network topologies. Additionally, the GAR-based approach
was developed based on full network knowledge; another
interesting issue would be to investigate the addressed problem
with incomplete network knowledge.
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